Doestopologicalperceptionreston amisconceptionabouttopology?
RobertoCasati Inthis articleI assess someresultsthat purport toshowtheexistenceof atypeof 'topologicalperception',i.e., perceptuallybasedclassificationoftopologicalfeatures. Strikingfindingsaboutperceptionininsectsappeartoimplythat(1)configural, global propertiescanbeconsideredasprimitiveperceptualfeatures,and(2)topologicalfeatures inparticularareinterestingastheyareamenabletoformal treatment.Idiscussfour interrelatedquestionsthatbearonanyinterpretationoffindingsabouttheperceptionof topological properties: whatexactlyaretopological properties, whatmakesthemglobal, inwhatsensethequotedfindingsmakesthemprimitive, andwhatarethehopesof a formaltheoryofperceptionbaseduponthem.Isuggestthatmathematicaltopologyisnot thecorrectmodelforcognitiontopological properties, hencethatsomeotherformalism oughttobeused-aformof''internalizedtopology.''However,oncetheprinciplesofthis typeoftopologyarespelledout,theymaynotbeasglobalisticasonemayhaveexpected.
Keywords: Topological Perception; Topology; VisualPrimitives Manylogicallyindependent but coordinatedfactorsconstrainthequest forvisual primitives.First,phenomenologytellsusthatthevisualsceneiscomplex,butatthe sametimethattherearerecurringelementsoutofwhichcomplexitymaybebuilt (Kanizsa,1979) . Second,mathematicalmodels showhowit is possibletobuild complexrepresentationsoutofrepresentationsofsimplercomponents (Biederman, 1987 (Palmer &Rock, 1994) . Finally, behavioral and neurophysiologicalevidence for specific, downtosingle-neuronsensitivity to relativelywell delineatedfeaturesof theenvironment hasbeengatheredoverthe lastdecades,startingfrom (Hubel &Wiesel, 1959) .Butdothesecriteriaconverge onasinglelist of primitives? Theydonot haveto, of course;andfindingout that what weexpect tobephenomenologicallyor computationallyprimitive is not sobehaviorallyorneurophysiologicallywill makeforaninterestingdiscovery. This is inpart theinterest of (Chen, Zhang, &Srinivasan, 2003) findingthat small brains suchas those of the honey bees display a sensitivity toglobal configurationalproperties,inparticulartopological propertiessuchasthepresence ortheabsenceof holes in2-ddisplays. It looks as if not onlybees areableto distinguishbetweenconfigurationsthat differonlyintheirtopological properties, butalsotheyareabletogeneralizetotopologicallyequivalentconfigurationsthatare rather different onmany other respects.Accordingto (Pomerantz, 2003) , the findings areinterestingfor tworeasons. Thefirst reasonis that thetopological propertiesinquestionaregenerallyconsideredasrelativelycomplexandhardto compute (Minsky&Papert, 1998) (1) Thepresenceofcompletevisual boundariesofaunit, and (2) Theuniformityandconnectionoftheunit(Palmer&Rock,1994),alongwith itsmaximality (Casati, 2002) .
Thepresenceofholesiscorrelatedwiththesesimplerfeaturesinthefollowingway.
Ifamaximal uniformconnectedunitpossessesjustonecompletevisual boundary, thenit has nohole. If it possesses twovisual boundaries,thenit has onehole. Ingeneral, 1 foranygivenvisual display:
(3) Formmaximaluniformconnectedfiguresandncompletevisualboundaries, thenumberofholesis(n-m).
The further element that is thenneededis that the visual systemimplement somewayof countingthefeaturesandcomparetheircardinalities. Givenwhatis knownaboutthelimitsoftheabilitytosubitizesmallquantities, itisexpectedthat thedifferencebetweenconfigurationswith,say,oneandtwoholeswillbeaccessible tothesystem.Atthesametime,thedifferencebetweenconfigurationswithnineand tenholes is expectednot be accessibletothe system.But surely these latter configurations are topologically distinct fromthe viewpoint of mathematical topology. Hencetestingtheabilityof distinguishingbetweenconfigurations with varyingnumbersofholescandecidebetweenaholisticandalessholisticaccountof visualproperties.
Furthermore, howfar cantopological generalizationgo? Letters I andJ are topologicallyequivalentintheintendedsense;butsoare,presumably,I,L,KandH (thelatterthree,forinstance,canallbe'shrunk'toanIwithout'cuttingorgluing'). Will dataconfirmasensitivitytotheseequivalences?Somemayexpectinsteadthat somesortof parsingbycomponentswill predictthattheseshapesareresilientto placementinasinglecategory:anHhasthreecomponents,anIhasonlyone.Here againtheglobalistichypothesiscanbepittedagainstothertheoretical accounts.
Itmaybequestionedwhetherfeatures (1)and (2)arereallysimplerthantheglobal featureof havingahole. After all, both(1) and(2) presupposethat theunity (connection) of boththe boundaryandthe figure are accessed; andassessing connectionisanotoriouslydifficultcomputational problem. However,ontheone hand, thisisageneral problem, onethat affectsall theoriesthat aresupposedto characterizetheentryunitsofthevisualsystem.Ontheotherhand,inordertoshow that sensitivitytothefeatureof possessingaholeis not sensitivitytoavisual primitive, it is enoughtoshowthat theformer canbeexplainedinterms of sensitivitytootherfeatures,withoutanyfurthercommitmenttothehypothesisthat thesefeaturesarethemselvesvisual primitives.
Toconclude,whatistheevidencethattopologicalorglobalfeaturessuchashaving aholeareprimitivesof thesystem, accordingtoChenet al. (2003) (Casati&Varzi, 1994) .
